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Part I
Context, Theory, Explanatory
Framework
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1
Global Change, Political Coalitions,
and National Responses
Intellectual property policies affect the processes by which knowledge and
information become privately owned, and the terms under which privately
owned knowledge and information are used. Because these arrangements
inﬂuence how citizens and governments access essential knowledge- and
information-intensive goods, such as educational materials, medicines, seeds,
and software, national policies in this area affect peoples’ lives, and countries’
trajectories of development in the global economy.
Traditionally, countries around the world enjoyed signiﬁcant freedom in
determining what types of knowledge and information beneﬁted from intel-
lectual property protection, and how much protection rights-owners enjoyed.
Intellectual Property (IP) policies were driven by national characteristics, such
as levels of income, industrial structure, scientiﬁc, and technological capabil-
ities. In general, poorer countries with less technological development tended
to adopt more lax IP policies to facilitate the use of knowledge and informa-
tion, and over the course of acquiring more technological capabilities the
amounts of IP protection they made available would increase as a reﬂection
of these changes. Indeed, the close relationship between national conditions
and IP policies has long been a staple of case study, comparative historical, and
econometric research.1
That world is a thing of the past. The late twentieth century was marked by
a fundamental transformation in the global politics of IP. In the 1980s and
1990s, as IP became deﬁned as “trade-related,” countries wishing to participate
in international trade became obligated to undertake signiﬁcant revisions of
1 See, for example, Chen and Puttitanun (2005), Dutﬁeld and Suthersanen (2005), Hudson and
Minea (2013), Kawaura and La Croix (1995), Kim et al. (2012), Kumar (2002), Maskus (2000;
2012), Marron and Steel (2000), May (2000; 2007a; 2013), May and Sell (2006), Odagiri et al.
(2010), Ordover (1991), Schiff (1971).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 22/5/2017, SPi
Comp. by: Bendict Richard Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0003103753 Date:22/5/17
Time:19:14:52 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0003103753.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 4
their policies toward patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other forms of IP.2
The drivers of national IP policy were now international, too.
The cornerstone event in this global sea change was the inclusion of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
in the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was founded in 1995.3 But
TRIPS is just part of the story. At the same time as new multilateral rules
were being established, the international IP regime was also shaped directly
by the actions of larger developed countries that gave the promotion of
IP increasingly prominent places in their foreign policy and aid agendas.
Similarly, international organizations such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) have acted as enthusiastic advocates of increased
protection. These shifts replaced a world marked by differentiation, where
national IP policies were allowed to correspond to local conditions, with a
world of harmonization, where all countries’ IP policies are expected to
correspond to new international standards.
The global sea change ushered in new IP policies throughout the world, as
country after country altered laws and created new state agencies, all toward
increasing levels of IP protection. Countries made patent protection available
in technological areas where it had previously not been allowed, for example,
they strengthened the rights of exclusion that patent owners enjoyed, and they
created new administrative agencies and courts to establish and protect these
new private property rights. The new approach toward IP is part and parcel of
yet another shift, as the focus on privately owned knowledge has been com-
plemented by a focus on “knowledge-based” development. Governments and
international organizations have come to embrace, at least rhetorically, the
role of IP as a stimulus for innovation, and the importance of innovation as
key to increasing ﬁrms’ competitiveness and national welfare (OECD 2013;
Powell and Snellman 2004).
Not surprisingly, as countries reacted to the global sea change, cross-
national indices of IP rights have come to reveal across-the-board increases.
The mean for ninety-nine developing countries in the most frequently cited
index of patent protection, which scores countries from zero to ﬁve, increased
from 1.6 in 1990 to 2.7 in 2000, reaching 3.1 by 2005 (Park 2008). Similarly,
the mean score of “legal transplantation,” an index of 121 developing and
post-communist countries’ similarity with policies of the United States (US),
rose by 150 percent from 1995 to 2008 (Morin and Gold 2014).
2 IP is the umbrella term for a range of instruments that confer rights of exclusion to the owners of
intangible goods. Patents protect inventions, copyrights, and trademarks protect forms of expression.
What they have in common is that they convert knowledge and information into private property.
3 On TRIPS and, more generally, the establishment of the IP-trade linkage, see, among others,
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), Deere (2008), Drahos (1995), Matthews (2002), Maskus (2012;
2014), May (2000), Muzaka (2011a; 2011b), Orsi and Coriat (2006), Pugatch (2004), Ryan
(1998), Sell (2003; 2010a).
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Yet even in this context of overarching increases in IP rights, we continue to
witness cross-national diversity. Countries reacted differently to the pressures
emerging from the global sea change, and then subsequently took different
steps in revising these policies and practices. The result of this iterative
policymaking process is that countries with new IP systems introduced in
response to the new external environment still differ on key characteristics of
how they establish and protect privately owned knowledge.
This book analyses this diversity, both cross-national variation in countries’
responses to the global sea change and longitudinal patterns of change within
countries, in the context of pharmaceutical patents. As of the late 1980s, patents
on pharmaceutical products were rarely available in developing countries.
Many countries offered patents on pharmaceutical processes, i.e. the manufac-
turing techniques for making drugs, but few did so for the chemical compounds
and medicines themselves. Firms could receive patents for these inventions in
most developed countries, but they would not even bother to seek patents on
pharmaceutical products in most developing countries because, simply, drugs
could not be patented.4 A key feature—arguably the single most important
feature—of the global sea change is to bar countries from retaining the statutory
prohibitions that most had until this time: countries must allow pharmaceutical
products to be patented. By themid-1990s, virtually all developing countries had
committed to introducing pharmaceutical patents, and by the mid-2000s this
process was complete in all but the poorest countries.
The shift from pharmaceuticals being largely non-patentable to being
nearly universally patentable is striking in terms of the global scope and
pace that this occurred—but it is far from the end of the story. Pharmaceutical
patents are new, and transitioning from a world where the knowledge associ-
ated with medicines was a public good to a world where such knowledge is
privately owned and controlled, generated new challenges for state and non-
state actors. In response to these challenges, many countries subsequently set
out to modify their new patent systems. While the initial policy choices in the
1990s regarded decisions over introducing pharmaceutical patents, policy
choices in the 2000s regarded making revisions to the new pharmaceutical
patent systems to adjust how they function. The end result of these two
episodes of change is that policies continue to vary in important ways. Or,
to put it differently, forms and styles of compliance with the new global order
of private knowledge in pharmaceuticals differs from country to country.
How to account for variation in national patent systems? This book
addresses that question with a two-stage approach. Countries’ initial responses
to the global sea change varied as a consequence of how industrial legacies
interacted with export proﬁles to affect the possibilities for building coalitions
4 Prior to the late 1970s, pharmaceutical patenting was not available in many developed
countries either, as discussed in Chapter 2.
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around the issues of when and how pharmaceutical patents should be intro-
duced. How these initial conﬂicts regarding the introduction of patents were
resolved, in turn, conditioned policy choices in the 2000s, around how the new
pharmaceutical patent systems function. The two periods of change are linked
in that the ﬁrst set of choices generated distinct challenges to be addressed, and
the initial choices also inspired different changes to social structure which, in
turn, affected subsequent possibilities for coalition building.
The empirics are drawn from the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
None of these countries offered pharmaceutical patents as of the late 1980s,
when they were signaled out for their resistance and came under considerable
pressure to make pharmaceuticals patentable (Gadbaw and Richards 1988b,
7–8). When they acquiesced to international pressures and agreed to intro-
duce pharmaceutical patents, they did so differently; and when they subse-
quently revised their new pharmaceutical patent systems they did so
differently again. Over the course of these two periods of change, Argentina
produced a “market-preserving” patent regime, featuring minimalist, by-the-
books adherence to the country’s new international obligations, complemented
by regulatory changes designed to help local ﬁrms adjust to the new status
quo and retain a dominant position with respect to international competition.
Brazil yielded a “neo-developmentalist” system, with the country adopting
global norms in a way that puts IP and innovation at the heart of development
policy, but at the same time introducing a range of measures designed to
ameliorate the effects of stronger protection. And Mexico produced an “inter-
nationalist” patent regime, marked by an expanding embrace of global norms
and adoption of “best practices,” all with an eye toward attracting foreign
investment into the pharmaceutical sector.
The objective of this book is to explain these differences in a way that allows
us, more generally, to understand cross-national and longitudinal variation in
national policies. While there is an abundance of scholarship on the global
politics of IP, explaining for example the integration of IP into international
trade rules and conﬂicts over IP at multilateral and regional levels, as well as a
proliferation of case studies of IP policymaking,5 our understanding of the
drivers of national responses to the new external environment remains under-
developed. This book offers a systematic approach toward studying cross-
national and longitudinal variation, one that allows us to understand how the
major changes in the global politics of IP migrate to the national level and
affect domestic policies and practices over time.
5 See, among others, the contributions to Coriat (2008), Dreyfuss and Rodriguez-Garavito
(2014), Haunss and Shadlen (2009), Löfgren and Williams (2013), Mani and Nelson (2013),
Shadlen et al. (2011). Important comparative studies (cross-national or within-country longitu-
dinal) also include Deere (2008), Eimer and Lutz (2010), Eren-Vural (2007), Filomeno (2014),
Flynn (2011; 2013; 2015), Godoy (2013), Guzmán (2014), Haggart (2014), Matthews (2011),
Ramanna (2005), Rodríguez-Franco (2012), Shadlen (2009b; 2012).
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Persistent differences in how countries go about establishing the ownership
of knowledge, and setting the terms on which privately owned knowledge is
used, have important implications for human welfare and economic develop-
ment. Patents confer exclusive rights over manufacture, distribution, and
sales; in a market where a drug is covered by a patent, there will likely be
just one supplier of the drug. We expect drugs with single suppliers to be more
expensive than drugs with multiple suppliers, so the introduction of pharma-
ceutical patents can, potentially, create barriers to access of essential drugs.
Also, as pharmaceuticals were often a strategic area for industrial promotion
and a source of manufacturing employment, new patent systems that endow
single ﬁrms with control have implications for economic development. Thus,
it matters how countries react to the global sea change in IP and position
themselves in the new international order.
Before proceeding, it is important to underscore that the relationships
between pharmaceutical patents, drug prices, and health outcomes are excep-
tionally complex. The extent to which patents yield high prices, for example,
depends on degrees of competition in given therapeutic segments, the avail-
ability of substitutes, the marketing strategies of ﬁrms that control patented
drugs, and the purchasing practices of public and private healthcare providers.
And access to medicines depends on more than the price of drugs: in some
countries, poverty and the state of healthcare systems mean that access to
medicines and adherence to treatment are problems even when drugs are free.
Yet, for all that, when drugs have a single supplier that can set the price, if that
price is high, some may suffer from reduced access, and the effects of reduced
access can be detrimental for individuals and public health.
And not only are the relationships between patents, prices, and health
complex, they are often difﬁcult to observe. Reduced access to key drugs
may produce a wide range of setbacks, deprivations, and hardships. Obviously,
lack of access to life-saving medicines can be fatal, a scenario that is exempli-
ﬁed in the case of HIV/AIDS, which in the absence of drugs is a death
sentence. Not all situations are so stark, but the challenges posed by patents
and prices are serious nevertheless. Lack of access to a particular drug might
mean that patients rely on inferior treatments and endure more pain and
suffering, or perhaps have to live with more discomforting side effects or
become more susceptible to other related illnesses. Lack of access to some
medicines may compel people to make multiple trips to clinics, for example,
perhaps spending more of their family income on transportation, or be unable
to continue in their employment. And so on. The effects on health and
livelihoods, short of life or death scenarios, are serious too, but these can be
hidden and thus difﬁcult for analysts to track and record.6 And of course the
6 It is often difﬁcult, as Godoy cogently writes, to provide a “body count” (Godoy 2013, 46–7).
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allocation of funds to secure access to drugs for one disease or condition,
where treatments are more expensive because of patents, may result in dimin-
ished access for other patients with other conditions.
The remainder of this chapter consists of three sections. The next section
situates the analysis in the context of broader scholarship in comparative and
international political economy. In doing so the key building blocks of the
coalitional argument are presented. The following section then reviews schol-
arship on the politics of IP, with an eye toward integrating international and
domestic factors. The ﬁnal section discusses the logic of case selection, the
method of data collection and comparative analysis, and the organization of
the chapters that follow.
HARMONIZATION, DIFFERENTIATION,
AND COALITIONAL POLITICS
The trends witnessed in IP, of big changes sweeping the globe and reﬂected in
currents of national convergence, alongside striking differences between coun-
tries, are anything but exceptional. To the contrary, the late twentieth and
early twenty-ﬁrst centuries constituted a period of persistent diversity in the
context of overarching convergence in many areas. Democratization swept the
world, economic liberalization became the norm, and anti-poverty programs
gained a central place on the development agenda, to give just three examples
of global trends, but countries continued to exhibit important differences in
their democratic political institutions and practices, the extent to which
economic actors are subject to market competition, and the characteristics
of social protection. Indeed, diversity in the context of convergence is the
norm. As countless scholars of comparative and international political econ-
omy have shown, broad tendencies toward convergence, be they rooted in
international rules, technological change, or the diffusion of new ideas, mani-
fest themselves differently in distinct national contexts.7
7 Examples, by no means a comprehensive list, include Brooks (2008) on diversity within the
shift toward privatized pension systems, Etchemendy (2011) on diversity in trade and industrial
policies in liberalizing countries, Mosley (2003) and Brooks and Kurtz (2012) on diversity of
ﬁnancial regulations in the context of ﬁnancial globalization and open capital accounts, Murillo
(2009) on diversity in national strategies toward privatizing and regulating public utilities, Rudra
(2008) on diversity of developing countries’ social welfare regimes in the context of globalization
and privatization, andWellhausen (2014) on countries’ diverse policies toward foreign investors.
Among scholars working on the politics of intellectual property, Haggart’s (2014) analysis of
digital copyright in Canada, Mexico, and the US is explicitly framed in terms of persistent
national diversity as well.
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In explaining cross-national and within-country diversity, the focus in this
book is placed on the ways that changes to social structure affect political
actors’ abilities to construct and sustain supportive coalitions. Executives are
key players throughout the analysis, as presidents bore the burden of respond-
ing to global pressures to adopt new IP systems in the 1990s, and Health
Ministries bore the brunt of dealing with the effects of new pharmaceutical
patent systems in the 2000s. These events altered Executives’ preferences,
often in unexpected ways. Yet Executives need room to act. Be they presidents
embracing the global sea change and seeking to introduce new IP regimes
in conformity with foreign governments’ and foreign investors’ wishes or
Ministers of Health reacting to the effects of pharmaceutical patents and
seeking to revise their countries’ new patent systems, Executives need to
build coalitions to overcome opposition and secure their desired outcomes,
i.e., to see that their policies can be enacted and sustained.
The analytic approach adopted here thus takes seriously Executives’ shifting
preferences, though placing them in the context of the changing constraints
within which Executives act. Political scientists and sociologists that empha-
size the constraints on agency often focus on political institutions, such as how
constitutions, legislatures, and party systems circumscribe Executive auton-
omy.8 I emphasize social structural constraints; how changing constellations
of interests create or foreclose opportunities for coalition building and, sub-
sequently, political action.
Attention is placed on two ways that constellations of societal interests are
transformed so as to alter the panorama of coalition-building possibilities.
First, international politics can reconﬁgure domestic political processes by
differentially empowering and mobilizing rival actors in state and society.9
The speciﬁc focus in this book is on the efforts of the United States Govern-
ment to make access to the US market conditional upon increasing the level
of IP protection. As many researchers have shown, external pressures can
encourage exporters to push for policy changes.10 I build on this research by
linking exporters’mobilization to a speciﬁc aspect of trade structure: depend-
ence on removable, discretionary trade preferences. Exporters typically have
little reason to participate in debates over IP, but threats of diminished
market access can change that. In situations where higher shares of exports
enter the US market under preferential and removable trading arrangements,
exporters, fearing loss of market access, can be mobilized by the advocates of
IP protection. I label this process, of otherwise indifferent exporters becoming
8 Calvo (2014); Carey and Shugart (1998); Corrales (2002); Flores-Macias (2012); Lichbach
and Zuckerman (1997); Mainwaring and Shugart (1997); Shugart and Carey (1992).
9 Brooks and Kurtz (2012); Farrell and Newman (2014); Frieden (1991); Gourevitch (1978;
1986); Katzenstein (1977); Keohane and Milner (1996); Rogowski (1990); Solingen (2009).
10 Baldwin (1985); Bastos (1994); Bayard and Elliott (1994); Gilligan (1997); Kaempfer et al.
(1987).
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preoccupied with a new issue and thus wanting their governments to acqui-
esce to external demands, “activating agnostics.”
That changes in the external environment, such as new international agree-
ments or shifting global economic conditions, can alter domestic political pro-
cesses, is the cornerstone of much of contemporary political economy. Scholars
of “open economypolitics” (Frieden 1991; Keohane andMilner 1996; Lake 2009)
typically identify the actors with a stake in a particular set of policy choices,
observe how these actors’ preferences and resources are altered by the relevant
international stimuli, and then consider subsequent domestic political processes.
Yet external pressures can mobilize new actors too (Jacoby 2006). The actors
identiﬁed ex ante as those with a stake in a given policy debatemay not constitute
the universe of relevant parties. External pressures can also affect domestic
politics by creating new constituencies—not just strengthening or weakening
already-interested actors, but expanding these actors’ range of allies by bringing
otherwise uninterested players into policy debates. Themobilization of exporters
as advocates of IP protection, i.e. activating agnostics, is an illustration of this
phenomenon.
The second way that coalitional possibilities change is that new policies can
alter subsequent trajectories of political mobilization (Falleti 2010; Pierson
1993; Thelen 1999; 2003; Weir 2006). Once policies are introduced, however
fraught the conﬂicts over their introduction, actors may subsequently adjust to
the new status quo. In such a context, phenomena of increasing and decreas-
ing returns affect successive policymaking episodes (Pierson 2000; 2004).
Increasing returns allows those engaged in favored activities to accumulate
resources, a process that entrenches constituencies for continuity. In contrast,
decreasing returns can dilute opposition to new policies once they are imple-
mented. New policies may also change the character of the state, by spurring
the creation of new agencies, institutions, and organizations, or by giving new
prominence and authority to existing bodies. Decisions on major policy issues
can shape subsequent trajectories of change and, importantly, the strategies of
actors that then work within the parameters established by the new status quo
(Farrell and Newman 2014; Immergut 2008; Shaffer 2014).
The asymmetric effects of policy choices on patterns of political mobiliza-
tion and subsequent episodes of coalition building invoke notions of path
dependence, where policymaking at T2 is not subject to a “roll of the die”
(Weir 2006) but conditioned by choices made at T1. Initial choices constrain
what follows, but, importantly, explanations that take into account the legacies
of policy choices need not mechanically demand continuity. Rather, the key is
to identify tractable effects of outcomes in one period on outcomes in a subse-
quent period.11 Just as new policies may entrench “winners” and encourage
11 Boas (2007); Capoccia and Kelemen (2007); Chorev (2015); Collier and Collier (1991);
Falleti and Mahoney (2015); Mahoney (2000, 2001).
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continuity, they may also trigger reactions by actors that seek to modify the new
status quo. In both scenarios, policies are producing patterns of political mobil-
ization that, in turn, condition subsequent episodes of policymaking. Nor does an
approach that takes seriously the path-dependent effects of policy choices pre-
clude the possibility that politicians may, simply, try to alter policy trajectories.
Even once countries have adopted one set of policies, elections can return a new
government that seeks change, or more simply political leaders may seek to alter
course on account of new ideas or new evidence. Yet actors’ range of freedom to
alter course is limited: policies adopted in one period, by transforming social
structure and the state, cast a shadow over policymaking in subsequent periods.
Together, changes to the international environment and path-dependent
policy effects can alter constellations of interests within national political
economies. The extent to which external pressures encourage exporters to
care about new policy areas affects opportunities for political action on the
part of Executives seeking to steer a given course. Likewise, reactions to
policies inspire new patterns of mobilization and thus reconﬁgure constella-
tions of interests, again shifting the social terrain upon which coalitions are
constructed. These changes open or foreclose opportunities for political
agency. Politicians that seek a particular course of action, in response to
external pressures, partisan biases, or new social challenges, need to build
coalitions—and their abilities to do so are affected by changes to underlying
constellations of interests and social structure.
This approach to changed social structure and thus shifting coalitional
possibilities allows us to understand patterns of cross-national and longitu-
dinal variation in IP policies. The global sea change converted Executives into
enthusiasts of patent protection in the 1990s. Yet presidents faced opposition
to altering their countries’ patent systems, and the extent to which they were
able to build coalitions to overcome this opposition depended on the ways that
the external shocks affected social structure. Then, in the 2000s, when Health
Ministers sought to revise their new patent systems, their opportunities for
action were constrained by the transformations of social structure induced by
the ﬁrst set of changes. The following section places the coalitional approach
in the context of previous research on the drivers of national IP policies.
THE DRIVERS OF COMPLIANCE
AND OVER-COMPLIANCE
Coalitional change helps us understand variation in the forms of compliance
with international rules and norms. The politics of patents is an iterated
process, with key policy choices occurring over two distinct periods. In the
1990s, countries established new patent systems in response to the global
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sea change; all countries complied with TRIPS, but they did so differently.
Then, in the 2000s, many countries sought to reform their new patent systems;
again, they did so differently. Just as post-Communist countries of Central
and Eastern Europe ﬁrst introduced private property rights and then subse-
quently reformed their new private property systems (Bohle and Greskovits
2012; Hancke 2008; Jacoby 2006; Szelényi 2015), or as countries privatized
pension systems and utilities and then subsequently introduced regulations
to these newly privatized sectors (Brooks 2008; Murillo 2009), countries
introduced pharmaceutical patents and then subsequently revised their new
patent systems.
How can we account for cross-national and within-country, longitudinal
variation in patent policies? As noted, theory and empirics both suggest that
IP policies are driven by domestic conditions. As countries acquire more
innovative capabilities and their scientiﬁc and industrial sectors move closer
to the technological frontier, for example, demands for increased IP protection
are expected to follow (Acemoglu et al. 2006; Chen and Puttitanun 2005;
Kalaycı and Pamukçu 2014). So universal was acceptance of the relationship
between national conditions and IP policies that one prominent scholar, in
reviewing the literature, characterized the link as “obvious” (Maskus 2000, 102).
As obvious as the relationship may have been, it is also obvious that domestic
factors, alone, can no longer adequately account for what has transpired in the
current era, when patent regimes of virtually all countries, with varying circum-
stances, have undergone profound changes. It is hardly conceivable that the
relevant national-level variables changed and reached similar thresholds to
establish the conditions for increased patent protection in so many countries
at the same time. Indeed, historically IP systems have tended to exhibit resist-
ance to abrupt change (David 1993; Lamoreaux et al. 1999; Lerner 2000). The
observation of profound transformations in a short period of time poses a
puzzle and necessitates taking seriously the international drivers of patent policy
change (Shadlen et al. 2005).
But how to think about the international drivers of policy change is not
entirely straightforward, either. The obligations imposed by the WTO and
TRIPS themselves do not sufﬁce as explanatory factors. All members of the
WTO are also parties to TRIPS. Because the Uruguay Round, the multilateral
trade negotiations that produced the WTO and the various agreements within
the WTO, was completed with a “single undertaking,” countries could not
pick and choose their agreements, but rather had to become parties to all of the
agreements included in the Final Act of 1994.12 However, while all countries
that are members of the WTO needed to comply with TRIPS, they had leeway
in determining how to do so, a point driven home emphatically by the
12 There are a few exceptions to this statement, for example, the WTO’s Government
Procurement Agreement is a “plurilateral” accord that countries can opt in or out of.
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abundant legal and policy literature documenting the signiﬁcant array of
TRIPS-acceptable policy options available.13
The relevant question is not if countries comply with TRIPS but rather how
they do so. Some countries may stick strictly to what the international rules
require, doing what needs to be done to remain safe from dispute settlement at
the WTO, but little more. Some countries may go beyond TRIPS, offering
more IP protection than the agreement requires. Forms of compliance—or,
more speciﬁcally, degrees of “over-compliance”—needs to be the focus of
attention.14 If we conceptualize the outcome as degrees of over-compliance,
then to understand variation we need to look beyond the WTO itself. After
all, the entire range of variation under study, from minimalist compliance to
extreme levels of over-compliance, is compatible with WTO membership.
Chapter 2 discusses speciﬁc policy choices that were contested in each
country. For now, staying at a more general level, the objective is to elucidate
the drivers of the different ways that countries comply with the global sea
change in IP.
The emergence of regional and bilateral trade agreements with IP provi-
sions that exceed TRIPS is commonly regarded as a driver of over-compliance.
The US, European Union (EU), and Japan have all negotiated a large number
of trade agreements with developing countries that include IP provisions
exceeding those in the WTO.15 To be sure, countries that enter into bilateral
trade agreements of this sort will end up with over-compliant patent systems.
Yet attributing IP policy outcomes to bilateral trade agreements may be
misleading. Countries might over-comply because they have bilateral trade
agreements with major trading partners, but just as well countries might have
these agreements because they have over-complied or are prepared to do so.
The latter scenario is highly plausible. The US Government, for example,
makes it clear that securing levels of IP protection beyond what is required
by TRIPS is an objective of negotiating trade agreements with developing
countries, and political leaders that enter into negotiations for such agree-
ments do so knowing that they will be expected to alter their IP policies
accordingly.
13 Bermudez and Oliveira (2004); Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002); Correa
(2000b); Hilty and Liu (2014); Kapczynski (2009); Musungu and Oh (2006); Reichman (1996;
2009a; 2009b); Scherer and Watal (2002); Shadlen (2009a); UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005); Watal
(1999; 2001).
14 I borrow the concept of “over-compliance” from Walter (2008; 2014). Gold and Morin
(2014), seeking to explain a similar phenomenon, refer to this as different levels of “legal
transplantation.” Many observers also refer to countries introducing “TRIPS Plus” policies.
15 The immense literature on IP in bilateral trade agreements includes El-Said (2005; 2007),
Fink and Reichenmiller (2005), Krikorian and Szymkowiak (2007), Kuanpoth (2008), Mercurio
(2006), Morin (2006; 2009), Roffe and Spennemann (2006), Sell (2007; 2010b), Seuba (2013),
von Braun (2012).
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Nor can trade agreements comfortably explain countries’ subsequent policy
choices, those introduced after all relevant steps required by the agreements
were taken. Consider the case of Mexico, the one country examined in this
book that has a bilateral trade agreement with the US, the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).16 Understanding Mexico’s patent policy
choices in the 1990s necessitates understanding Mexico’s pursuit of NAFTA,
but the trade agreement’s explanatory power for Mexico’s subsequent policies
is weaker. Because NAFTA’s IP provisions are permissive, compared to more
recent trade agreements, they left Mexico with ample opportunities to modify
the patent system in the 2000s.17 That Mexico did not do so, and even
accentuated the degree of over-compliance, cannot be attributed to obligations
that the country incurred as a party to NAFTA. Indeed, the policy changes of
the 2000s occurred not because of restrictions imposed by the IP provisions in
NAFTA, but rather despite the opportunities for policy innovation allowed
by NAFTA.
Technical assistance, whereby local ofﬁcials and policymakers are aided in
adopting “best practices” in IP policy by donor governments and international
organizations, is also regarded as a driver of over-compliance. The US, EU,
and Japan have extensive technical assistance and capacity-building programs,
as do international organizations such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization.18 In the mid-1980s, for example, the United States Patent and
Trademark Ofﬁce launched the Global Intellectual Property Academy, to
“help countries around the world improve their IP programs and services.”19
Such initiatives, which provide assistance in drafting legislation or training
ofﬁcials, can encourage countries to adopt IP policies and practices that exceed
the WTO’s requirements.20 Here again, as with trade agreements, the causal
links need to be considered with caution. Countries typically approach foreign
governments and international organizations and request technical assistance;
the observed outcomes may not be attributable to technical assistance, so
much as the conditions that prompted the country to request technical
16 Mexico has trade agreements with the EU and Japan too.
17 The literature on IP in regional and bilateral trade agreements tends to neglect NAFTA,
largely for the reasons discussed in the text. NAFTA was negotiated in the early 1990s, prior to
the completion of the TRIPS negotiations and establishment of the WTO, and the IP provisions
in NAFTA are more similar to the IP provisions in the WTO than is the case with trade
agreements negotiated in the 2000s.
18 Ghafele and Engel (2012); Matthews and Muñoz-Tellez (2006); May (2004); Morin and
Gold (2014); Peterson (2012); Roffe et al. (2007).
19 See ‘History of the Global Intellectual Property Academy’, at goo.gl/sFql2h.
20 In addition to these studies that examine the role of technical assistance in shaping
countries’ policies, other work focuses on how technical assistance affects implementation.
Drahos (2008; 2010), for example, acknowledges cross-national differences in policies, but argues
that technical assistance may yield similarities in patent ofﬁces’ administrative and interpretive
practices, a process he refers to as “invisible harmonization.”
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assistance. Simply put, we are rarely observing countries that were undecided
on IP policy and over-complied on account of technical assistance, but,
typically, countries that decided to over-comply and requested technical
assistance to help them do so.
While neither trade agreements nor technical assistance provide sufﬁcient
explanations for countries’ initial choices to over-comply, both of these can
certainly affect IP policy outcomes, indirectly, over time. As trade agreements
cover many policy areas, these can have myriad effects on the economy and
society, which in turn can alter coalitional possibilities. Policy options that
were available but foregone at one point may no longer be feasible, politically,
at a later point, on account of changes to social structure induced by trade
agreements. If the broader changes to social structure that trade agreements
can bring about are more consequential than the agreements’ binding IP
provisions per se, trade agreements may be more signiﬁcant in a political
economy sense than strictly legal sense. Technical assistance and capacity-
building programs can also affect social structure and the state. Even if the
existence of a technical assistance program may reﬂect (rather than drive) a
country’s decision to over-comply, it can embolden constituencies within the
receiving country. This may happen via the strengthening within the state, in
both material and reputational senses, of patent ofﬁces, and by increasing
national ofﬁcials’ integration into global networks (Drahos 2010). The effects
of technical assistance delivered as a consequence of policy choice in one
period can alter the state and social structure and thereby constrain policy
choice in a subsequent period.
External pressures, in the form of trade sanctions, are another external factor
that are commonly cited as drivers of over-compliance.21 The most visible actor
here has been the United States Trade Representative (USTR), which engages
in a global monitoring practice, evaluating all countries’ IP regimes. Since 1989
the USTR has issued the annual Special 301 Report, essentially a global report
card. Each country identiﬁed in the Special 301 reports is placed on a “Watch
List” or “Priority Watch List,” or, more severely, labeled as a “Priority Foreign
Country.” As countries are placed on the Watch List and then escalated to the
Priority Watch List, the threat and likelihood of bilateral trade sanctions
increase, and when a country is identiﬁed as a Priority Foreign Country,
which Drahos (1995, 423) labeled “trade’s death row,” the USTR is obligated
to initiate proceedings to apply trade sanctions.22 Any assessment system has
21 Deere (2008); Drahos (1995; 2001); Flynn (2015); Morin and Gold (2014); Okedjii (2004);
Pechman (1998); Sell (2003; 2010a); Stacy (2004).
22 Although Priority Foreign Country is meant to trigger the process leading to trade
sanctions, countries can be sanctioned without ever being labeled as such. It is worth noting
that the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, which is the law that required the USTR to conduct the
Special 301 reviews, did not specify the Watch List or Priority Watch List. Congress instructed
the USTR to identify “Priority Foreign Countries,” a status that would trigger an immediate
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 22/5/2017, SPi
Global Change, Political Coalitions, and National Responses 15
Comp. by: Bendict Richard Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0003103753 Date:22/5/17
Time:19:14:52 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0003103753.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 16
benchmarks against which subjects are being measured, and the benchmark
for the USTR’s assessments has never been the TRIPS agreement, which of
course did not exist yet when the system was introduced in 1989, but rather a
vision of “best practices” that go beyond anything required by international
agreements. And this continued after the WTO was created and TRIPS
came into effect in 1995. According to the “Uruguay Round Agreements Act,”
failure to provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
can trigger trade sanctions “notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country
may be in compliance with the speciﬁc obligations of the TRIPS Agreement.”23
Countries are pressured to over-comply, and threatened with trade sanctions
if they do not do so.
Here too the effects of Special 301 need to be considered with caution. To be
sure, the USTR keeps a watchful eye on IP practices around the globe and is
exceptionally active in pushing countries to adopt over-compliant patent
regimes. As Table 1.1 indicates, the number of countries identiﬁed has
increased greatly since the Special 301 process began, starting at twenty-ﬁve
countries, consistently twice that number for a period in the 2000s, and
even when declining after 2005 always considerably above the 1989 level.
Many of the countries targeted by the USTR have indeed over-complied
with their TRIPS obligations, but not all countries fall into line; national
responses to these bilateral pressures differ greatly. Indeed, notwithstanding
the USTR’s own touting of Special 301’s effectiveness in altering national
practices and the considerable attention it attracts, research on the effects of
the USTR and Special 301 (and of US trade sanctions more generally) are
decidedly ambiguous.24 Neither small-n comparative case studies nor large-n
econometric analyses have been able to demonstrate systematic effects of
Special 301 on countries’ IP policies.
The challenge is thinking about the conditions under which trade pressures
might be effective in altering countries’ policies. To elicit a response, threats to
punish countries need to be credible, in that the USTR has to be able to take
investigation and lead, potentially, to the imposition of retaliatory trade sanctions. In the ﬁrst
year, the USTR exploited ambiguity in the law’s phrasing to modify the system and supplement
the category of Priority Foreign Country with the Watch List and Priority Watch List. According
to the USTR, establishing these incremental levels constituted “an enhancement that we [the
USTR] have added to the statute to make it more effective” (Q/A, at end of Fact Sheet, 1989
Report annexed to the initial Special 301 Report, USTR 1989a). To make the process yet more
supple, in 1993 President Bill Clinton’s ﬁrst USTR, Micky Kantor, added “out of cycle reviews” as
an additional lever.
23 I am grateful to Duncan Matthews for bringing this passage of US trade law to my
attention.
24 Studies demonstrating the ambiguous effects of USTR pressures include Bayard and Elliott
(1994), Bentolila (2002), Buscaglia and Long (1997), Deere (2008), Elliott and Richardson
(1996), Hirst (1998), Knapp (2000), Morin and Gold (2014), Noland (1997), Sell (1995),
Shadlen et al. (2005), Zeng (2002).
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the steps it is threatening to take, and worrisome, in that whatever it is that
might be removed as punishment must matter enough to stimulate a reaction.
Obviously if two countries engage in little trade than threats to remove market
access are unlikely to have much effect. Yet even in the case of countries that
engage in extensive trade, the ability to impose restrictions on another coun-
try’s exports are limited to some degree by the WTO. Because WTO members
must grant all other members equivalent market access, known as most-
favored nation (MFN) treatment, the US ordinarily cannot raise tariffs on
one country’s exports of a given good without raising tariffs on all countries’
exports of that good, and threats to raise tariffs across the board and thus
affecting all exporters, on account of a single country’s actions, may lack
credibility.
Table 1.1. USTR’s Special 301 Reports: Number of
Countries Listed
Year Number*
1989 25
1990 23
1991 29
1992 34
1993 30
1994 27
1995 32
1996 34
1997 47
1998 49
1999 55
2000 57
2001 51
2002 51
2003 50
2004 52
2005 52
2006 48
2007 43
2008 46
2009 45
2010 41
2011 40
2012 40
2013 41
2014 37
2015 37
2016 34
* Number includes countries included on the Watch List, Priority
Watch List, or identiﬁed as Priority Foreign Country.
Source: Author’s elaboration from USTR’s Special 301 Reports
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Not all trade takes place on MFN terms, however, and threats to raise tariffs
that are not subject to MFN can have more credibility. The WTO allows
countries to positively discriminate and grant some countries preferential
(“better-than-MFN”) market access. The bilateral trade agreements discussed
above constitute one example of this, another is through a set of programs
known as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that permits prefer-
ences outside of reciprocal trade agreements. The United States (along with
many other countries) has an array of GSP and GSP-related schemes that offer
preferential access on a discretionary basis. Whereas the preferences between
partners in bilateral trade agreements are bound by international commit-
ments, preferences granted under the GSP, also above and beyond the MFN
concessions of the WTO, are granted at the pleasure of the importing country,
and can be removed at the pleasure of the importing country as well. More-
over, and in contrast to MFN-based market access that, if adjusted for one
country needs to be adjusted for all countries, the US can selectively extend and
withdraw preferential market access.
The discretionary and removable attributes of GSP make it an important
factor to consider in thinking about the effectiveness of trade sanctions.
Pushing countries into altering their IP practices by withdrawing regular,
MFN market access can invite retaliation in ways that attempts to do so
by withdrawing better-than-MFN preferential market access does not.
If the US Government wishes to remove MFN trade beneﬁts from a WTO
member, it is constrained in doing so and any measures must be enacted in
a non-discriminatory manner; a developing country, even one that is highly
dependent on the US market for exports, can challenge the US under the
WTO’s dispute settlement rules for denying it MFN treatment. Likewise, if the
US wishes to remove preferences granted to a partner of a bilateral trade
agreement, it is constrained by the terms of the agreement. But importing
countries have more discretion with regard to the better-than-MFN trade
beneﬁts they make available under GSP schemes.
These characteristics of trade are useful for understanding the conditions
under which external pressures may achieve their goals. In their study of legal
transplantation in IP, for example, Morin and Gold (2014) ﬁnd that that
USTR pressures were associated with over-compliance in the 1990s but less
so in the 2000s, and they attribute this to the inability of the USTR to wield the
instrument of removing preferences. The authors refer to a 1999 WTO legal
ruling, which called into question importing countries’ abilities to unilaterally
remove preferences, and suggest that this gave developing countries comfort
to ignore the USTR’s threats. Trade structure prompts us to think of this
differently. It very well might be that countries ignore the USTR because they
regard threats to remove preferences as illegal and lacking credibility, but it
also may be that countries regard the threats and possibilities of sanctions as
genuine, but disregard them anyway because the effects of being punished are
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minimal. After all, the USTR’s pressures were not uniformly effective prior to
the 1999 WTO ruling either. As much as an issue of international law, the
effectiveness of the USTR’s pressures may vary on account of conditions
within the targeted countries.
The structure of a country’s trading relationship with the US can make the
USTR’s threats to remove preferential market-access concessions more or less
credible, and more or less worrisome. If exporters have minimal dependence
on US preferences, either because they export relatively little to the US, or
because what they export enters the US under ordinary MFN tariffs or
preferences that constitute commitments in bilateral trade agreements, then
we would not expect threats—even credible threats—of preferences to be
withdrawn to generate much concern. Yet if removable, preferential exports
to the US constitute a higher share of overall exports, we might expect the
USTR’s threats to be more alarming.25
The share of a country’s exports that enter the US on preferential and
removable terms, and thus its sensitivity to the removal of concessionary
market access, constitutes its “political trade dependence” (PTD). The adjective
“political” is used to emphasize that market access is extended and withdrawn
according to political winds in the importing country.26 The distinctiveness of
this measure of trade dependence is critical. A standard measure of bilateral
trade dependence is one country’s exports to another (e.g. the US) as a share of
its total exports. This can be supplemented with a measure of asymmetrical
export dependence, which considers country X’s exports to the US as a share of
total exports, relative to US exports to X as a share of total US exports (Zeng
2002). Neither of these measures captures the level of exporting countries’
dependence on market access that is concessionary and subject to withdrawal.
All countries that export highly to theUS are sensitive to ﬂuctuations in demand
derived from changes in the US economy, but they do not experience the same
sort of vulnerability as a country with high PTD.
Threats of diminished market access can alter political coalitions and affect
IP policy by mobilizing exporters. Most manufacturing ﬁrms in basic, labor-
intensive industries are generally unconcerned with patents; they neither
seek patents for their own inventions nor regard patents as relevant for their
access to others’ inventions. But when their continued access to the US
market depends on revising national practices, these otherwise indifferent
and uncommitted ﬁrms and their sectoral organizations may be converted
into enthusiastic lobbyists for patent protection. Again, this is referred to as
25 Morin and Gold (2014) do not consider countries’ trade structure in their analyses, neither
of the 1990s when they regard the USTR as important, nor of the 2000s, when the USTR’s
demands are regarded as less consequential.
26 The concept of political trade dependence is developed and explored in Manger and
Shadlen (2014) and Shadlen (2008).
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“activating agnostics” because we would not expect these actors to care one
way or the other about patent policy, but they may be made to care on
account of their dependence on—and demand for retaining—preferential
access to the US market. A country’s PTD level should not be regarded as a
generator of spontaneous mobilization and predictor of patent policy, but
rather a conditional factor that simpliﬁes or complicates coalition building.
As presidents and Ministers of Health seek to build coalitions for their
desired policy outcomes, they need to cultivate and mobilize bases of
support. PTD provides a reading of the social terrain upon which coalitions
can be constructed; it is a way that social structure enables or constrains
Executive agency.
In addition to mobilizing exporters, another way that external shocks can
reconﬁgure constellations of actors and interests, and thus alter coalitional
possibilities, is through the policies themselves. As discussed, even if bilateral
trade agreements and technical assistance are not the drivers of initial policy
choices, they can alter state and society in such ways as to shape subsequent
policymaking episodes. New agencies, institutions, and organizations—
sometimes even new ministries—may be created, for example, or new lines
of funding put into place. As new challenges emerge, the character of the state
confronting these challenges may be fundamentally different from when
initial policy decisions were made, and transformed by the earlier choices.
Policy choices can also affect social structure. The introduction of new laws
and regulations deters some activities, through outright prohibition or by
raising the associated costs. As actors who face decreasing returns adjust to
the new status quo, either by adapting to the new regulations or shifting their
activities into other areas, they become less available to participate in political
coalitions. Some actors that might have participated in political coalitions in
one time period, prior to a policy change, may no longer be available in a
subsequent period, after the change. Importantly, these patterns of reaction
and adjustment do not transpire immediately, so, as shall be discussed further
in Chapter 2, a key factor is how long the new policies are in effect and have a
chance to settle and alter social structure.
How coalitional possibilities are affected by adjustment to the introduction
of pharmaceutical patents is one of the key analytic issues in this book; it is the
counterpart to how coalitional possibilities are affected by trade pressures and
activation of agnostics.27 As most pharmaceutical patenting is done by a
handful of leading global ﬁrms, with industries in developing countries oper-
ating far from the technological frontier in this sector, allowing pharmaceut-
ical products to be protected by patents is likely to increase transnational
27 The process of actors’ patterns of adjustment affecting industrial structure is similar to
what evolutionary economists refer to as “selection” and “structured feedback” (Malerba and
Orsenigo 2015).
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ﬁrms’ presence in local markets. In the next chapter we will examine the
relevant issues in more detail, for now it sufﬁces to note simply that patents
allow ﬁrms to keep out competitors. Where new products might have had
multiple producers in the past, each with shares of the associated revenues, in
a system with pharmaceutical patent protection the returns to new products
are captured by single patent-owning ﬁrms.
How do local ﬁrms adjust to this new status quo? Most obviously, trad-
itional business models of copying new drugs cease being viable as these
become patented locally. Some ﬁrms attempt to adjust by trying to become
more innovative, investing more in research and development of new drugs.
Adjustment along this path can convert these ﬁrms into advocates of patent
protection. Some ﬁrms disappear; barred from continuing with past practices
and unable to adopt new viable practices, many industries close.28 For all their
differences, the various forms of adjustment can have similar effects on efforts
to revise pharmaceutical patent systems. These ﬁrms may have resisted the
introduction of pharmaceutical patents in the ﬁrst place, but, once the country
has a patent system, they have adjusted in ways that dampen their opposition.
Neither those investing more in R&D nor those that cease to exist constitute
useful allies for health ofﬁcials seeking to build coalitions to ameliorate the
effects of pharmaceutical patents. Adjustment can thus cause defensive coali-
tions, i.e. the sets of actors that opposed the global sea change in the 1980s and
1990s, to wither.
Yet these two forms of adjustment, trying to be more like “big pharma” or
ceasing to exist, do not constitute the universe of responses to the introduction
of pharmaceutical patents, and the withering of defensive coalitions is not
inevitable. Even in countries with patents, opportunities for production and
sales continue to exist in older drugs: because patents expire, pharmaceutical
markets include segments featuring ﬁrms using knowledge that is no longer
privately owned. Some local ﬁrms continue to exist, and new ﬁrms continue to
emerge, selling older drugs where patents are no longer relevant or entering
the market with follow-on versions when patents expire. In sum, rather than
reacting to the new status quo by becoming originator ﬁrms or exiting the
sector altogether, many ﬁrms adjust to the introduction of pharmaceutical
patents by becoming different types of non-originator ﬁrms (del Campo 2016;
Kale 2010; Shadlen 2007). Local pharmaceutical ﬁrms in developing countries
may become more like “generic” pharmaceutical ﬁrms in developed countries,
trying to avoid infringement in their new market segments, while militating
against abuse of the patent system. Depending on local ﬁrms’ abilities to react
in this way, defensive coalitions can persist or be reconstituted for subsequent
conﬂicts over how pharmaceutical patent systems function.
28 Some ﬁrms may pursue rearguard strategies and continue to make their own versions of
patented drugs, but doing so is risky and not the norm.
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Differential patterns of adjustment to initial policy choices affect subse-
quent coalitional possibilities. Policy choices made in the 1990s cast a shadow
over policymaking processes in the 2000s. The former does not determine the
latter, but, by triggering distinct patterns of adjustment, the ﬁrst set of choices
conditions the second. The two policymaking episodes that are central to this
book, introducing pharmaceutical patents and revising new patent systems,
are not independent events. Differences in how patent regimes were intro-
duced in the 1990s generate distinct challenges and inspire different patterns
of adjustment in domestic pharmaceutical sectors, which in turn affect possi-
bilities for coalition building in the 2000s.
To summarize, the focus here is on two mechanisms by which constella-
tions of actors and interests change in response to external shocks, and as they
do so shift the opportunities for coalition building. The ﬁrst regards trade
pressures mobilizing exporters and altering the universe of actors that care
about IP policy. The second regards policies, once introduced, inspiring
patterns of adjustment and reconﬁguring interests around IP policy. Both of
these mechanisms shift the social terrain in ways that can enable or constrain
policymakers seeking to build coalitions to secure their desired outcomes.
Where higher shares of exports enter the US market under preferential and
removable trading arrangements, building coalitions for over-compliance in
the introduction of pharmaceutical patents becomes easier. And depending on
the magnitude and duration of the shock generated by initial policy choices
and subsequent transformations of state and society, efforts to modify new
patent systems are also constrained.
Finally, and to return to a larger theme of this book, it is important to
underscore that both of these mechanisms constitute domestic politics being
shifted by international changes. While this is easy to see with regard to trade
pressures mobilizing exporters, it is also the case when we observe political
coalitions reshaped over time by domestic actors’ reactions to new policies.
The new constellations of interests and patterns of mobilization are the
products of an exogenous shock in the ﬁrst place. If not for the fundamental
changes in the global politics of IP, we are unlikely to have witnessed the initial
policy changes that transformed the state, inspired adjustment, and subse-
quently reshufﬂed social structure. Even if the most important factors ac-
counting for policy variation in subsequent periods are domestic, the entire
political economy has been shaped by the initial exogenous shock. This is,
essentially, a revised formulation of what Gourevitch (1978) labeled the
“second image reversed.” In the original, the question asked was how changes
in the international environment affect national policies. The answer, which
became foundational for decades of research in comparative and international
political economy, was that the effects are mediated by national political
processes. Here, adopting a longitudinal perspective, we can see how entire
political economies can be transformed because of earlier external events. The
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proximate causes are domestic, but the domestic conditions themselves
have international roots.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA SOURCES,
METHODOLOGY, AND ORGANIZATION
Intellectual property provides a useful terrain to study the national conse-
quences of international change, because without new international rules and
the mass of pressures that countries faced in the 1980s and 1990s (i.e. the
global sea change) there is little reason to expect developing countries to have
revised their IP systems. Other areas of economic policy that also underwent
substantial change in this period, such as trade, ownership of state enterprises,
and regulations on foreign investment, had typically been contested internally
for long periods of time, with some actors seeking the liberalization of imports,
privatization of state enterprises, and greater opening to foreign investment.
Though countries undeniably were subject to external pressures in these areas
too, it is reasonable to expect that, even in the absence of new international
rules and overtures from foreign governments, debt crises and deteriorating
economic conditions would have yielded signiﬁcant degrees of policy change.
In the case of IP, in contrast, little if any change would have occurred in the
absence of external pressures. To illustrate, even as many developing countries
were fundamentally revising their development strategies in the 1980s, many
continued to ﬁght for international rules endorsing lax IP protection and
ﬁercely resisted overtures to change national practices (Gadbaw and
Richards 1988a; Sell 1998). Notwithstanding crises of development strategies
and dramatic changes in countries’ economic policies, IP is an area where the
status quo appeared to be ﬁrmly locked in place—until uprooted by an
external shock in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Of course external shock in this period had implications not just for
countries’ policies and practices regarding patents, but other forms of IP too,
including those regarding copyrights, trademarks, industrial secrets, and so
on. Each of these ﬁelds animates different sets of interests and mobilizes
different sets of actors in society and the state. And even within the realm of
patents, patterns of conﬂict may vary by technology. Focusing on the politics
of pharmaceutical patents narrows the scope of research, and in doing so
allows us to tighten our analytic lens and present a parsimonious and system-
atic explanation for the national effects of global shifts in ways that are not
possible when assessing the outcome of TRIPS implementation in all its
dimensions as previous scholars have recognized (Deere 2008; Morin and
Gold 2014).
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A further, substantive, reason to focus on the political economy of pharma-
ceutical patents is the unrivalled prominence of this particular issue area. In no
other sector are patents valued so greatly as mechanisms of appropriation as
they are in the drug industry, and pharmaceutical ﬁrms spearheaded the global
campaign to integrate IP policy into international trade rules. Furthermore,
whether or not countries should be obliged to introduce pharmaceutical
patents was the singularly most contested and divisive issue during the
TRIPS negotiations, and the implications of the subsequent requirement to
do so have remained the central point of conﬂict in the decades since TRIPS
entered into effect, attracting an extraordinary amount of attention from
analysts, activists, and international organizations. Quite simply, in most
countries, political conﬂicts about complying with TRIPS are, de facto, con-
ﬂicts over pharmaceutical patenting.
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are appropriate cases for comparison, as
these were among the countries most heavily targeted by external pressures.
As of the late 1980s, none of the three allowed pharmaceutical products to be
patented, yet each appeared to offer international drug ﬁrms large and poten-
tially lucrative markets were they able to obtain patent protection. In a study of
IP protection in Asia and Latin America that the Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
ers of America29 presented to the US Government in 1987, Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico (along with India) featured as the most “problematic” countries
and where industry most wanted the US to act: in these countries the level of
protection available was the lowest and the expected gains to transnational
ﬁrms of obtaining patent protection were greatest, yet these countries were also
singled out for being the most reluctant to change their policies (Gadbaw and
Richards 1988b; Nogués 1990). The three Latin American countries in par-
ticular thus attracted the ire of the transnational pharmaceutical sector and the
attention of the US Government, as achieving IP policy changes in these three
countries became a key objective of US foreign economic policy (Buscaglia and
Long 1997; Elliott and Richardson 1996; Harrison 2004; Hirst 1998). Though
each faced considerable external pressures, these three countries demonstrated
differences on the key social structure variables that are advanced in this book
as the factors affecting diversity in coalitions and compliance: industrial leg-
acies in the local pharmaceutical sectors, and export proﬁles.
This book utilizes the approach and tools of comparative historical analysis,
examining national patterns of change as the outcome of the social forces
interacting and unfolding over time (Katznelson 1997; Mahoney and
Rueschemeyer 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2015; Thelen 1999). One of the
key insights of the comparative historical approach is that the same factors,
even when scored similarly, may affect outcomes differently depending on the
29 In the 1990s this association would insert research into its title and rename itself the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).
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pace at which events unfold.30 Accordingly, the structured comparisons focus
on the markedly different ways that similar events occurred in three countries
over time, with emphases on timing and the sequential nature of change.
Analytic emphasis is not placed on the behavior of electorates, but rather
diverse forms of political action by broad social groups. Coalitions, central to
this book, are conceptualized as informal alliances that manifest actors’ collect-
ive expression of shared interests and objectives in the public sphere. Import-
antly, coalitions studied this way are identiﬁed by the analyst; they are not
formal entities, such as agreements between parties in legislatures.31
The comparative case studies allow us to adjudicate between rival explan-
ations for political outcomes. Where countries that appear similar in terms of
the external pressures they are subject to and the preferences of incum-
bent Executives yield different responses, for example, we can question the
explanatory power of those variables alone. Of course, countries always vary in
multiple ways that are out of the researcher’s control (i.e., we can neither keep
constant nor manipulate all the relevant variables), confounding purely cor-
relational efforts at making causal inference in small-n analyses. Case study
research helps us to understand the changing relationship between variables
over time, creating a forensic account of what affected what, and how. Within-
case analysis and process tracing are used to assess alternative causal pathways
of the outcomes of interest: the “causal process observations” obtained
through process tracing enable the researcher to determine if the evidence
ﬁts one explanation better than another (Collier et al. 2010; Bennett and
Checkel 2014a; Fairﬁeld 2013; Fairﬁeld and Charman 2017, forthcoming).
Comparative case studies based on process tracing are also essential for
understanding how coalitions are constructed and change. Forms of compli-
ance are not attributable directly to social structure; rather, forms of compli-
ance are tied to the characteristics of political coalitions that social structure
both enables and encumbers. This means that we need to build on material
and more easily observable indicators, such as the market shares of rival
segments of industry, and consider the way actors engage in collective action
and cultivate allies, and their strategies to exploit contacts with legislators and
Executive ofﬁcials. We also need to see how Executives, seeking to introduce
policy changes, respond to the opportunities and constraints presented by
social structure. These sorts of political activities are at the heart of coalition
building, and they can only be identiﬁed through case studies. Of course,
linking changed characteristics of coalitions to policy outcomes is difﬁcult, and
the risk of falling into circular reasoning is ever-present. Process tracing allows
30 See, among others, Collier and Collier (1991), Falleti (2005), Falleti and Lynch (2009),
Falleti and Mahoney (2015), Grzymala-Busse (2011), Pierson (2003; 2004).
31 Doner and Schneider (2016, 618) make this distinction as well. See also the contributions to
Smith et al. (2014).
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us to study the phenomena of coalitions expanding (or shrinking), mobilizing
to drive policy change, and, critically, the temporal relationship between these
events and the outcomes of interest (Thelen and Mahoney 2015).
The research is based on ﬁeldwork in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In
addition to archival sources, press accounts, and statistical data, the research
was informed by extensive interviewing. Informants in each country were
identiﬁed according to functional positions, with the goal of conducting
similarly structured interviews with clusters of actors from the same areas
and positions in each country. For example, in each country I interviewed
representatives from pharmaceutical industries, both subsidiaries of trans-
national ﬁrms operating locally and national ﬁrms, as well as lawyers working
with these segments of the pharmaceutical sector. Likewise, in each country
I interviewed ofﬁcials from relevant areas of the Executive, including ministries
and secretariats, patent ofﬁces and health regulatory agencies, as well as from
Congress, including legislators, legislative assistants, and legislative researchers.
And in each country I interviewed civil society actors, such as professionals
from the medical and health ﬁelds, and individuals or organizations focused on
the promotion of national science and innovation policies, as well as activists
engaged in work around IP, including—but not restricted to—those working
speciﬁcally on matters related to pharmaceutical patenting and access to medi-
cines. The Fieldwork Appendix presents the location and period of ﬁeldwork in
each country, along with information on the informants in each of these
functional ﬁelds.
Beyond formal, conﬁdential interviews, the research has beneﬁted from a
substantial amount of correspondence in other forms. For example with some
of the informants I have had ongoing email exchanges over course of multiple
years. Though I do not identify informants in the text, where interviews and
emails are cited I provide information on the functions and positions of
relevant actors (and these cited interviews are listed following the references).
Using interview data presents well-known challenges for causal inference,
challenges that have been amply debated (Brady and Collier 2004; Mahoney
2010; Mosley 2013; Rathbun 2008). Most obviously, the pool of subjects
interviewed is not random; in fact the pool should not be random when it is
essential to communicate with particular individuals about key events. And of
course information relayed by informants may be incomplete, self-serving,
partial, or inaccurate. One way to address these concerns was to seek “satur-
ation,” i.e. to interview multiple people from each functional category to reach
the point where additional interviews are not providing new information
(Bennett and Checkel 2014b; Bleich and Pekkanen 2013; Lynch 2013).
In addition, the information obtained from interviews about the role of actors
in events has been cross-checked against information from the public record,
newspapers, and archives (often referred to as “triangulation”), and frequently
informants were asked to clarify inconsistencies in follow-up interviews
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or other forms of interaction. Saturation and triangulation thus allow the
researcher to be conﬁdent that the information obtained from interviews is
accurate, and, moreover, as part of a research design based on within-case
analysis and process tracing, these steps allows us to use interviews as a
method for collecting data to assess rival explanations.
Chapter 2 presents the substance of the policy debates. The chapter pro-
vides greater context on IP, patents, and the particular characteristics of
pharmaceuticals that have always made this industry a focal point of conﬂict.
In addition to presenting the speciﬁc policy issues that were contested as
countries introduce pharmaceutical patent systems in the 1990s and then
reform these new patent systems in the 2000s, the chapter presents the
explanatory framework for understanding cross-national and within-case
longitudinal variation in patent policy. That is, while the discussion in this
chapter has discussed the relevant variables and mechanisms in more abstract
form, Chapter 2 presents this more concretely, with reference to the speciﬁc
debates over pharmaceutical patents.
The empirical material that follows is divided into two clusters of chapters
corresponding to two periods of patent politics. Chapters 3–5 analyze how
countries introduced new pharmaceutical patent systems in response to the
global sea change of the 1980s and 90s, and Chapters 6–8 analyze how
countries went about reforming their new patent systems in the 2000s in
response to emerging challenges. In each time period the chapters are pre-
sented in the same order, starting with Argentina, followed by Mexico, then
Brazil. The chapters are not presented in chronological order, but rather to
highlight key aspects of the explanatory framework, namely how changing
social structure and export proﬁles establish the conditions for Executives to
build coalitions to secure their desired policy outcomes. Chapter 9 synthesizes
the main ﬁndings of the book and discusses the implications of the research
for the study of comparative and international political economy, and also
considers the challenges that developing countries face in adjusting their
development strategies to the new world of pharmaceutical patenting.
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